In this work we study situations in which communication among the players is not complete and it is represented by a family of subsets of the set of players. Although several models of partial cooperation have been proposed, we shall follow a model derived from the work of Faigle and Kern. We define the games on convex geometries and introduce marginal worth vectors and quasi-supermodular games. Furthermore, we analyze some properties of the marginal operators on the space of games on convex geometries.
Introduction
In the framework of cooperative games, one often assumes that all players will cooperate. However, there are many intermediate possibilities between universal cooperation and no cooperation. In this work we discuss a class of partial cooperation structures and develop a model of cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form.
The interest in the particular study of games defined on families of feasible coalitions which have the structure of a convex geometry is derived, initially, from the observations indicated by G. Owen (1986) when he analyzes the simplifications which are produced in the computation of the Myerson value if, in the communication situation (N, v, G) , the graph which models the partial cooperation among the players is a tree. Later, the special characteristics of these singular communication situations (N, v, G) , in which G = (N, E) is a tree have been made clear, among others, in Borm, Nouweland, Owen and Tijs (1993) when the problems of allocation of costs are analyzed and integral formulas are found for the calculation of the Myerson value; Grafe, Mauleon and Iñarra (1995) in the search of a procedure for computing the nucleolus; and Potters and Reijnierse (1995) in the study of an equilibrium character of games restricted by communication graphs, their nucleolus and the relations between the bargaining set and the core. Faigle and Kern's paper (1992) on cooperative games under precedence constraints bears the closest relation to our work.
In general, the specific properties of the trees, in relation with other types of graphs, lie in their connected character, in that the intersection of connected subgraphs leads to a connected subgraph and that any connected graph is the graph originated by the convex hull of its extreme points. These characteristics and the results obtained in the previously mentioned studies make it interesting to plan the study of games defined on families of feasible coalitions which have a combinatorial structure with analogous properties to the aforementioned.
In the next section, we introduce convex geometries and define the games on these set families. We introduce marginal worth vectors and quasi-supermodular games and study several relations between certain solution concepts for these games.
In the third section we analyze the minimal and the maximal marginal operator for games on convex geometries. Both concepts were introduced by Curiel and Tijs (1991) for cooperative games.
Games on Convex Geometries
In this section, we define the concept of convex geometry (see Edelman and Jamison (1985) ) and we describe some of its fundamental properties.
A convex geometry on a finite set N is a family L ⊆ 2 N which satisfies the following properties:
Unless stated otherwise throughout this paper we suppose N = {1, . . . , n} and L is always a convex geometry on N .
An element in a convex geometry L is called convex set.
We denote by ex(A) the set of all extreme points of A.
A maximal chain C of L is an ordered collection of convex sets
such that there does not exist a convex set M and 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 satisfying
We denote by C(L) the set of all maximal chains of L. Note that when L = 2 N there are n! maximal chains corresponding to all orderings of players, and for any S ∈ 2 N , ex(S) = S. We shall often use the following property of convex geometries (Edelman and Jamison (1985) ): For each S, T ∈ L with S ⊂ T , there exists a maximal chain C ∈ C(L) containing both S and T . Example 1. The family L = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} is a convex geometry. There are three maximal chains in L,
and ex({1, 2}) = {1, 2}, ex({2, 3}) = {3} and ex({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 3}. Some families of sets with convex geometry structure which have appeared in literature related to partial cooperation are the following.
Example 2. The family of convex subsets of a finite partially ordered set (N, ≤) is a convex geometry (Birkhoff and Bennett (1985) ). In this context, S ⊆ N is a convex set if a ∈ S, b ∈ S and a ≤ b imply c ∈ S for all c ∈ N such that a ≤ c ≤ b. The convex geometry obtained considering the natural order on N , which we name Co(N ), has been used by Edelman (1997) to model a class of voting games. (N, G, v) , where (N, v) is a cooperative game and G = (N, E) is a graph. This concept was first introduced by Myerson (1977) , and investigated by Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) 
Example 3. A communication situation is a triple
is a connected and cycle-complete graph, then the family of all coalitions of N that induce connected subgraphs L = {S ⊆ N : (S, E(S)) is connected in G }, is a convex geometry.
Example 4. Let (P, ≤) be a finite partially ordered set. For any X ⊆ P , X →X = {y ∈ P : y ≤ x for some x ∈ X}, defines a closure operator on P . Its closed sets (that is, X ⊆ P such thatX = X) form a convex geometry J(P ). Faigle and Kern (1992) studied games defined on distributive lattices J(P ). Throughout this work, Γ(L) will denote the vector space of the games on L.
is called quasi-subadditive if the reverse inequality holds and additive if equality holds.
One of the main topics dealt with in cooperative game theory, is to divide the amount v(N ) between the players if the grand coalition N is formed. The core of the game v ∈ Γ(L) is the set
where x(S) = i∈S x i and x(∅) = 0. Note that the core of a game v ∈ Γ(L) is a polyhedron that is not necessarily bounded. However, it is a polytope if and only if the family L is atomic (see Bilbao, Jiménez, Lebrón (1999) ).
Since every maximal chain of L has exactly n + 1 convex sets, there is a minimal convex set in every maximal chain that contains a player i. Thus, for every i ∈ N and C ∈ C(L), we denote by C(i) the minimal convex set in chain C which contains player i, that is, C(i) represents the coalition of L formed by the player i and his predecessors in the chain C.
The property (C3) of a convex geometry allows us to consider that the coalition formed by all players is reached by sequetial processes of one by one incorporation of the players in the game. A maximal chain C ∈ C(L) can be considered as defining a possible order in which the players form the grand coalition N . Each player i obtains the amount that he contributes to the coalition C(i)\{i} already formed. The marginal contribution of i if the grand coalition N is formed in the order given by the chain C is defined by a
The marginal worth vector associated with the maximal chain C is a C (v) ∈ R n whose i-th coordinate is equal to a C i (v) . These vectors satisfy the following property.
Lemma 1. Let v ∈ Γ(L) be a game and C ∈ C(L). For all S ∈ C, we have
Note that S n = N and hence j∈N a
The Weber set of v ∈ Γ(L) is the convex hull of marginal worth vectors associated to all maximal chains in L, that is,
Weber (1988) and Derks (1992) 
N , as we show in the following example.
Example 5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and L = {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. This convex geometry has the following maximal chains
Let v ∈ Γ(L) be the game given by v(S) = |S| if |S| ≥ 2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. The marginal worth vectors are given by
and hence, W eber(L, v) = conv{(0, 2, 1), (2, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0)}. On the other hand, Core(L, v) = conv{(0, 2, 1), (1, 2, 0), (0, 3, 0), (1, 1, 1)} and it is obvious that Core (L, v) W eber(L, v) and W eber(L, v) Core(L, v) . Shapley (1971) In order to analyze the relationship between these solution concepts for v ∈ Γ(L), we introduce the concept of quasi-supermodular game.
A
game v ∈ Γ(L) is quasi-supermodular if for all S, T ∈ L with S ∪ T ∈ L it holds v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
A game v ∈ Γ(L) is quasi-submodular if the reverse inequality holds.
The following results provide us with several characterizations of the class of quasi-supermodular games.
Proposition 1. Let v ∈ Γ(L) be a game on a convex geometry. The game v is quasi-supermodular if and only if for all S, T ∈ L such that T ⊂ S and for all i ∈ ex(S) ∩ T, it holds v(S) − v(S\{i}) ≥ v(T ) − v(T \{i}).

Proof. Let S, T ∈ L with T ⊂ S and i ∈ ex(S) ∩ T. If S = S\{i} and T = T , then S ∩ T = (S\{i}) ∩ T = T \{i} ∈ L, and S ∪ T = (S\{i}) ∪ T = S ∈ L. Applying the definition of quasi-supermodularity to S and T , it follows that v(S) + v(T \{i}) ≥ v(S\{i}) + v(T ).
Conversely, let S, T ∈ L such that S ∪ T ∈ L. If T ⊆ S or S ⊆ T , then the equality is clear. Consider S ∩ T = S and S ∩ T = T and let C ∈ C(L) be a maximal chain such that T ∈ C and S ∪ T ∈ C.
As S\T = ∅, put |S\T | = k and write S\T = {i 1 , . . . , i k } with C(i 1 ) ⊂ · · · ⊂ C(i k ), i.e., the chain C is given by
and it follows that
A similar proof leads us to show that a game v ∈ Γ(L) is quasi-submodular if and only if for all S, T ∈ L such that T ⊂ S and for all i ∈ ex(S) ∩ T, it holds v(S) − v(S\{i}) ≤ v(T ) − v(T \{i}).
Theorem 1. A game v ∈ Γ(L) is quasi-supermodular if and only if it satisfies
Proof. Let v ∈ Γ(L) be a quasi-supermodular game. We prove that the marginal worth vectors a
Conversely, let us assume that a
In a likewise manner it is possible to prove that a game v ∈ Γ(L) is quasisubmodular if and only if i∈S a
As the core of v ∈ Γ(L) is a convex set, an immediate consequence of this result is the following.
Corollary 1. A game on a convex geometry v ∈ Γ(L) is quasi-supermodular if and only if W eber(L, v) ⊆ Core(L, v).
The Marginal Operators
is called marginal game associated to the chain C of the game v.
Marginal games are of interest as they lead us to the Shapley value. The Shapleyvalue is the average of marginal games. That is, if v ∈ Γ(L) then the Shapley value Φ(v) is,
where it is assumed that all possible orders (maximal chains in L) of formation of N are equally likely.
Futhermore, marginal games were used by Curiel and Tijs (1991) to introduce marginal operators on Γ(2 N ). These marginal operators (the minimarg and the maximarg operators) have nice properties. This section is devoted to define these operators on Γ(L) and comprove if they verify analogous properties in this case. In the following result, we establish relations among the core of the games v, M i(v) and M a(v) and the Weber set of v.
Theorem 2. Let v ∈ Γ(L) be a game on a convex geometry. Then (L, Mi(v) ). Since the core is a con-
Mi(v)(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ M a(v)(S), for all S ∈ L and equality holds for
3. Let L be an atomic convex geometry. First, we prove that if there exist
Thus,
and this contradiction proves that Core (L, Ma(v) 
On the other hand, if the Core (L, Ma(v) ) is nonempty then all marginal worth vectors coincide.
In (3), the atomicity hypothesis on L is crucial, because if L is not atomic, Core (L, Ma(v) ) is not bounded and therefore, the inclusion Core (L, Ma(v) ) ⊆ W eber (L, v) does not hold.
It is obvious that M i(v) is quasi-superadditive and M a(v) is quasi-subadditive by definition of these games. Moreover, it is easy to prove that if n ≤ 3, M i(v) is quasi-supermodular and M a(v) is quasi-submodular. In general, M i(v) need not be quasi-supermodular and M a(v) need not be quasi-submodular. The following result provides us with a sufficient and necessary condition for the quasi-supermodularity and quasi-submodularity of a game using the marginal operators. 
